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Lynn C. Klotz
Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, Washington, DC, USA
In a Letter to the Editor of mBio, Professor Ron Fouchier pub-lished a calculation (1) in which he finds a very low probability,
P1, for a laboratory-acquired infection (LAI) for a single lab for a
single year. Claiming numerous safety precautions in his biosafety
level 3 (BSL3) laboratory, Fouchier calculates P1 1 10–7 per
person per year, and since there are 10 workers with access to his
laboratory, P1 1 10–6 per lab per year. Compare this to P1
2  10–3 per lab per year for BSL3 laboratories calculated from
CDC statistics for undetected or unreported LAIs (2, 3), here
called “community LAIs,” as it is assumed that an undetected or
unreported LAI represents an infection that has traveled outside
the lab and into the community.
Recently reported escapes of LAIs from high-level biocontain-
ment at CDC laboratories (4) and the long history of LAIs and
other escapes from laboratories (5) also argue that Fouchier’s
value for P1 is too low. Lipsitch and Inglesby (6) have supplied
additional arguments as to why the Fouchier value for P1 is likely
much too low.
Fouchier uses a simplistic formula, y  1/P1, to calculate the
elapsed time in years for an LAI to escape from his laboratory, y
1/(1  10–6)  1  106, that is, the million years stated in his
Letter. It is not clear what this calculation tells us. Does it give us
the elapsed time for a 10% chance that an LAI occurs? Does it give
us elapsed time for a 50% chance, or an 80% chance? In this re-
gard, the elapsed time for a 100% chance is infinite, as we can
never be absolutely certain that an LAI will occur.
I suggest attaching little weight to this elapsed time calculation
and instead concentrating on risk  likelihood  consequences,
starting with the P1 probability, specifically: potential pandemic
fatalities (probability of a community LAI) (probability that
the community LAI leads to a pandemic) (estimated fatalities in
a pandemic).
My risk calculation estimates the likelihood of a community
LAI for both a single laboratory and n laboratories conducting this
research over y years. The total number of laboratories involved in
this potential pandemic pathogen research is called here the “re-
search enterprise.”
A single, easily derived equation is used to determine the like-
lihood of a community LAI:
E 1 1 P1yn (1)
where E is the probability of at least one community LAI from n
laboratories in y years. Example results are presented inTable 1 for
three values of P1.
In Table 1, the number of laboratories is either n  1 for a
single laboratory, such as Fouchier’s, or n 30, which is twice the
15 laboratories currently subject to the NIH funding pause. Pick-
ing n 30 is a reasonable guess since there are likely many other
labs throughout the world conducting this research that are not
funded by NIH. y  10 years is a reasonable time frame for this
research to be completed.
The rationale for picking the probabilities, P1, in Table 1 is as
follows: P1 2 10–3 is calculated from the CDC statistics (2, 3).
P1 2 10–4 is 10-fold less and is my “guestimate” for a BSL3
lab with rigorous safety practices. P1  1  10–6 is Fouchier’s
calculated value.
There are valuable observations to be gleaned fromTable 1. For
instance, taking into account the whole research enterprise, not
just a single lab, is important.
Furthermore, even for Fouchier’s very low value for P1, there is
an estimated probability of E  0.0003 that there will be at least
one community LAI over a 10-year period for 30 labs (likely ex-
actly one LAI, as two is much less probable). As I will soon show,
E 0.0003, or 0.03%, is not nearly small enough to reduce risk to
an acceptable level. Also, this E value assumes that all 30 labora-
tories involved in this research enterprise have the rigorous safety
practices of Fouchier’s lab, a highly unlikely assumption.
Summarizing the literature, Lipsitch and Inglesby (7) estimate
the probability that a community LAI leads to a global spread
(pandemic) to be 5 to 60%. This range is consistent with the 5 to
15% range found by Merler and coworkers (8) and with the 1 to
30% range found in a focused risk assessment (9) for infection
spread beginning on crowded public transportation. As an illus-
tration, using an intermediate value of 10% for pandemic proba-
bility, which is within the estimated ranges, the probability that a
community LAI occurs and leads to a pandemic would be
0.0003 0.1 3 10–5.
A pandemic could result in 140 million fatalities (world popu-
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TABLE 1 Probabilities of at least one LAI escape into the communityc
Estimated probability E
P1 Comment n 1a n 30b
2.00E–03 From CDC data 0.0198 0.45
2.00E–04 10 less than CDC data 0.0020 0.058
1.00E–06 From Fouchier’s analysis 0.00001 0.0003
a A single BSL3 or BSL3 lab.
b Twice the number of NIH-funded labs studying gain-of-function pathogens with
pandemic potential.
c In equation 1, y is the number of years that research was carried out.
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lation of 7 billion, 20% infected, 10% fatality rate). Thus, in this
example the estimated number of fatalities for the research enter-
prise could be 3 10–5 140 million 4,200 fatalities, and the
estimated “fatality burden” for each lab in the research enterprise
could be 4,200/30 140 fatalities over 10 years or 14 fatalities per
year. To put this fatality burden number in perspective, no Insti-
tutional Review Board tasked with assessing human subject re-
search would approve a proposed research project with 14 poten-
tial fatalities per year.
If insteadP1 2 10–4 orP1 2 10–3 ismore representative
of the real probability, then the fatalities and fatality burden for
each lab in the enterprise would be much higher. Over the assort-
ment of BSL3 and BSL3 labs that may be participating in the
research enterprise, frighteningly high fatality burdensmay not be
unrealistic.
To try to understand the meaning of Fouchier’s simplistic
equation y  1/P1, I substitute into equation 1 the values calcu-
lated by Fouchier (P1 1 10–6, y 1 106 years, n 1, for his
single lab) to find E 0.63. As I suspected, the value is high.While
I do not knowof anything significant thatwemight learn from this
observation that Fouchier’s calculation implicitly implies a high
value for E, it at least answers the question put forth in the second
paragraph of this letter about the meaning of his calculation of
elapsed time to an escape. Recall that the highest value of the
probability E is 1.0, which implies absolute certainty of an escape,
which would take infinite elapsed time, y.
Even if every laboratory in the research enterprise is as safe as
Fouchier claims his is, potential pandemic fatalities and fatality
burden are still too great. Until the research enterprise is restricted
to only a few special BSL4 labs, with extraordinary precautions
(3) to reduce significantly the probability of community infec-
tions, the international community should agree to pause this
research indefinitely. Alternatively, the research should be rede-
signed to not require the development of live respiratory aerosol-
transmissible potential pandemic pathogens (10).
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